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Richard F. Elmore*
The negative income tax experiments were designed to influence
political debate on income support policy in at least two ways. One was
methodological -- to focus the policy debate on a few key empirical
questions and produce more definitive evidence than would have been
available through nonexperimental methods. Another was political -- to
legitimize the idea of a universal cash transfer program, scaled to the
recipient’s income, as an alternative to the patchwork collection of in-
kind and categorical assistance programs that had grown up since the
New Deal.
Methodological Issues
Social experiments are thought to hold certain advantages over
nonexperimental policy research. They frame policy questions in more
precise terms. They permit more precise statistical tests of effects. And
they introduce a dimension of greater empirical discipline to discussions
of policy issues.
These advantages are, however, purchased at some cost. The very
rigor of social experiments limits the utility of their results. First, exper-
imental treatments are, of necessity, packages of discrete elements --
in the negative income tax experiments, various combinations of
guarantee levels and marginal tax rates. Inferring the effects of
treatments not represented in the experiment from experimental results
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requires extrapolation between or beyond treatments. This extrapolation
is no more rigorous than most nonexperimental research. Second, treat-
ments are, of necessity, implemented in specific sites, which means that
experimental results have to be combined with nonexperimental survey
data to estimate the effects for the population as a whole and to estimate
the cost of generalizing the treatment. Combining experimental and
nonexperimental results reintroduces most of the methodological
tangles that experiments were designed to eliminate. Finally, experi-
ments take place at particular times, against a background of particular
policies and particular economic, political, and social conditions that in-
fluence the responses of subjects. These background factors cannot be
controlled experimentally. Hence, it is always problematical whether ex-
perimental results gained under conditions at Time I will generalize to a
different set of conditions at Time 2.
These methodological problems are well-known, at least to those
familiar with social experiments. They have been addressed with im-
pressive ingenuity and technical virtuosity in the various analyses and
reanalyses of the negative income tax experiments, including those
reported in this volume. On balance, though, the kind of precision the
experiments have supplied may be of doubtful utility to policymakers.
As the experiments have matured, a kind of infinite regress into
methodological and theoretical complexity distances the results from the
concerns of policymakers.
Imagine a member of Congress innocently asking, "How will an
income guarantee, based on the principles of the negative income tax,
affect the likelihood that its recipient will work, the amount of work that
a recipient will do, or the amount of income that a recipient will earn?"
An answer to this question that is consistent with the experimental
evidence would have to be qualified in at least the following ways: (1)
the nature of benefit packages available to experimental subjects was
limited; (2) benefit packages available to control groups at the time of the
experiment varied unsystematically from one setting to another; (3) the
effects of an income guarantee on labor supply were different for dif-
ferent population groups within experimental settings; (4) dfferent ex-
periments produced quite different estimates of effects; (5) misreporting
of income and work by experimental subjects influenced the results in
ways that cannot be fully explained; (6) benefit packages available to
poor people have changed since the experiments, making it difficult to
estimate the effect and cost of changing .the existing system; (7) little cor-
respondence exists between the benefit packages tested in the experi-
ment and the range of benefit packages that could be made available
under a feasible reform proposal; and (8) the population of potential
beneficiaries of an income guarantee would be significantly different
from the population tested in the experiment.208 Richard F. Elmore
To be sure, the answer could be simplified considerably by trimming
off these methodological uncertainties, and by averaging results across
experiments. To do so, however, sidesteps the methodological rationale
for doing experiments in the first place. Being precise, it seems, also
means being complex and equivocal. Methodological precision is
apparently not the same as clarity or policy relevance.
Social science researchers are accustomed to these inward-turning
spirals of ever-increasing complexity.~ This is the stuff of which social
science reputations are made. The main product of research is, after all,
proposals for more research. Elected officials may be forgiven, however,
if they do not share this enthusiasm, since they operate under different
time constraints and different incentives.
One of the major lessons of the negative income tax experiments,
then, is that methodological precision is not positively related to the
clarity or policy relevance of results. This is hardly a novel finding,1 but
it bears repeating before the promises for the next round of social ex-
periments are made.
Political Issues
In addition to policy research, the negative income tax experiments
were also political advocacy. The New Jersey Income Maintenance Ex-
periment was conceived, in 1966-67, by a group of policy analysts in and
around the Office of Economic Opportunity as a way of forcing the
negative income tax into the political debate on income support.2 To be
sure, more politically astute ways exist of legitimizing a novel policy idea
than to run a costly, long-term experiment with indeterminate results.
But the advocates of the negative income tax were social scientists, not
politicians, and they did what social scientists do best -- they wrote a
research proposal.
Over time, the experiments expanded and were accompanied by
related research on poverty, spawning a significant analytic group
within the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare and an enor-
mous contract research industry outside the government. This analytic
subgovernment became the main source of continuity in advocacy of the
negative income tax during the welfare reform debates that followed.
Variants on the negative income tax found their way into the
presidential or congressional arena on at least five occasions:
o In 1965 and 1966, the Office of Economic Opportunity presented
President Johnson with proposals for a universal negative income
tax. The proposals fell to budget pressures and the opposition of
Undersecretary (later Secretary) Wilbur Cohen of the Department
of Health, Education, and Welfare.3A POLITICAL SCIENTIST’S VIEW 209
o In 1969, President Nixon proposed the Family Assistance Plan,
which combined an income guarantee with food stamps. The Plan
passed the House in 1970, languished in the Senate, was rein-
troduced in 1971, failed again, and was abandoned by Nixon in
1972.4
o In 1974, Congresswoman Martha Griffiths, Democrat from
Michigan, proposed an income maintenance plan consolidating
several existing cash and in-kind programs. The proposal gained
the endorsement of Griffiths’ Subcommittee on Fiscal Policy of
the Joint Economic Committee, and was the subject of hearings in
both houses in 1976, but did not progress further,s
~ At the same time as the Griffiths proposal, Health, Education, and
Welfare Secretary Caspar Weinberger proposed an income-
guarantee reform to President Gerald Ford, who rejected it in
favor of more modest incremental changes.6
~ In 1977, the Carter administration, after a period of bruising in-
tramural combat between the Departments of Labor and Health,
Education, and Welfare, introduced the Program for Better Jobs
and Income which combined income supplements, earned in-
come tax credits, and public jobs, in a supposedly zero-cost, com-
prehensive reform. The proposal never reached the floor of either
house of Congress. The reasons offered for this failure included
opposition from organized interests, conflicting Administration
priorities, and budget constraints.7
The preparation of each of these proposals entailed considerable
analytic staff work, which benefited, no doubt, from the existence of a
well-staffed analytic subgovernment. In this sense, the federal govern-
ment’s investment in income support policy research paid off.
The published record shows, however, that the results of the
negative income tax experiments entered the policy debate explicitly
only twice. The first occasion was in early 1970, when the Office of
Economic Opportunity, under pressure from Congress, released
preliminary results from the New Jersey experiment less than two years
after its commencement, showing what it claimed was a negligible
impact of a negative income tax on labor supply. This report was
immediately rebutted by a General Accounting Office study that labeled
the results "premature.’’8 The second occasion was in late 1978, when
Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Democrat from New York, an-
nounced in a speech on the Senate floor that evidence of high rates of
family dissolution among recipients in the Seattle-Denver experiment
had caused him to question his earlier advocacy of a negative income
tax.9 Neither of these occasions captures what policy researchers have in
mind when they think about the use of research in policymaking. Both,
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value of methodological sophistication in clarifying policy choices.
Another striking feature of political debate on income support is the
relative infrequency with which empirical estimates of effects, of the
type represented by the negative income tax experiments, figure in deci-
sionmaking. Most of the debate on the Family Assistance Plan and on
the Program for Bet~er Jobs and Income, both within the executive and
between the executive and Congress, focused on what might be called
the architecture of proposals -- the way various existing programs and
their disparate benefit levels could be melded into a defensive reform
package -- and on the winners and losers created by various alternatives
to the existing system. On occasion, the debate required estimates of
population parameters and total costs. If these could be supplied by the
analytic subgovernment, so much the better. If they could not, that was
OK too -- any reasonable estimate would suffice. In other words,
policymakers were mainly concerned about the incremental effect of
changes, on the architecture of benefit programs and on winners and
losers. They were not overly constrained by the lack of solid causal
evidence on the issues regarded as important to designers of the
negative income tax -- notably labor supply and family structure.
Judged in terms of their direct effect on policy, then, the influence of
the experiments has been modest-to-negligible. But direct effects are
deceptive. If we have learned nothing else from two decades of
systematic research in the service of policymaking, it is that -- to use
Carol Weiss’s terminology -- the "decision-,d, rive" m,,odel of policy
research is less accurate descriptively than the climate ’ model.~°That
is, research influences policy not by marshalling specific evidence in
support of specific decisions, but rather by shaping policymakers’
perceptions of the relevant problems and the feasible range of solutions.
This view tracks with John Kingdon’s research on political decision-
making, which concludes that "Academics, researchers, and con-
sultants affect the alternatives more than the agenda, and affect long-
term directions more than short-term outcomes.’’1~ In Kingdon’s view,
the formulation of a working agenda of policy problems, the formulation
of alternative solutions to those problems, and the politics of decision-
making normally operate as three separate, more or less autonomous
processes. Only on rare occasions do these three streams converge into
what Kingdon calls "policy windows," or opportunities for major
changes in policy.~2
Viewed from this perspective, the negative income tax experiments,
and related policy research on poverty and income support, have had
about the effect one would expect. The analytic subgovernment that
grew up around the negative income tax is one of a few select locations
for stockpiling policy options -- or "option depots" -- in the event that
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ment has recently been joined by other, less social science oriented,
more ideological option depots. When the problem-identifying and deci-
sionmaking streams occasionally converge, as they have on four or five
occasions over the past 20 years, these option depots supply some of the
raw material for policy debate. This raw material gets unpacked and
repackaged with other raw material in a variety of ways during the
policy debate. The results are, for the most part, horrifying and depress-
ing to the personnel of option depots, who see their careful work being
defiled by amateurs and dilettantes.
This view also explains why the negative income tax experiments
have had such a modest effect on income support policy and why the
clear-cut vision of reform offered by their advocates is constantly messed
up by policymakers. First is the issue of timing. The experiments ran on
what might be called "social science time," or S-time. It has taken close
to 20 years to get the experiments up and running, to accumulate and
analyze the results, and to subject those results to the kind of critical
scrutiny and secondary analysis required to tease out their strengths and
limits. Even then, researchers have argued that the treatments were not
in place long enough to give useful information about their long-term
effects on labor supply. The policy process, on the other hand, runs on
"political time," or P-time. The key determinants of P-time, for pur-
poses of income support reform, are presidential elections and annual
budget cycles. The calendar on P-time is shorter and more compressed
than on. S-time. On the few occasions when income support policy
reform has surfaced in P-time, the results of the income support ex-
periments have not been sufficiently mature in S-time to provide useful
guidance to policymakers.
Second, the process of problem identification and political agenda-
building contains much intelligence of importance to policymakers that
is considered to be random noise by policy researchers. Advocates of the~
Family Assistance Plan and the Program for Better Jobs and Income, for
example, consistently ignored signals from individual members of Con-
gress and political advisers within the executive branch that
"guaranteed income" and "negative income tax" were terms that car-
ried very problematical overtones for certain key members and their
constituencies. After the Family Assistance Plan proposal, the negative
income tax became anathema to A1 Ullman, Chairman of the House
Ways and Means Committee, because of its extreme complexity, its
potentially enormous cost implications, and its association with an
earlier political debacle. Policy researchers found this aversion to be irra-
tional and nonsensical, because after all, one could demonstrate
analytically how existing benefit programs contained perverted and in-
ferior versions of the same basic elements as the negative income tax. In
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deliberate design of an income support system around certain policy
variables with certain outcomes specified; for elected officials, welfare
reform was the repackaging of programs so as to create a winning coali-
tion. In the debate about the Program for Better Jobs and Income,
analysts from the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare con-
tinued to serve up negative income taxqike options in the face of mount-
ing evidence that key members couldn’t stand them. The analysts were
laboring in their own option depot, defending their product, disdainful
of the difficulties their work was causing in the political arena.
Third, the process of political decisionmaking usually works in ways
that are upside down, backwards, or perpendicular to the proposals of
policy researchers. In the debates, for example, both President Nixon
and President Carter stipulated certain budget and policy constraints
early in the decisionmaking process that forced executive staff to make
serious compromises in the architecture of the plans. The Family
Assistance Plan contained a budget constraint and a stipulation that
food stamps had to be treated separately and not cashed out. The Pro-
gram for Better Jobs and Income contained a zero-cost constraint and the
forced marriage of the Health, Education, and Welfare and Labor
Departments through the amalgamation of cash assistance and jobs. In
both these exercises, one could have produced a "better" plan -- in both
political and analytic terms -- without the constraints imposed by
presidential leadership, but the Presidents insisted on them.
Finally, policy research tends to focus, as it should, on the effects of
options on recipients. In political decisionmaking, though, the relevant
units of analysis also include organized interest groups and state and
local governments. In both the Family Assistance Plan and the Program
for Better Jobs and Income, the architecture of the benefit packages
could be defended for recipients overall, but the plans collapsed under
scrutiny of their effects on recipients on the margins of existing pro-
grams and their effects in high benefit states and localities. The intended
beneficiaries of income support policy are not, for the most part, the in-
terests that have the most influence in the formulation of that policy.
These conditions of political decisionmaking mean that large-scale
policy research efforts of the type embodied in the negative income tax
experiments will inevitably have a very limited influence on policy. The
notion that social experiments could be used to leverage income support
policy in the direction of a negative income tax has been proved by ex-
perience to be patently absurd. The problems of timing, or marshalling
the right political intelligence for the right moment, and of building
political constituencies around specific proposals far outrun the com-
plexity of designing and running an experiment. The notion of
deliberate investment in option depots and of the careful stockpiling of
evidence on the complex and equivocal effects of reform policies is notA POLITICAL SCIENTIST’S VIEW 2t3
absurd, however, if it is accompanied by low expectations that these
options and evidence will have a direct effect on policy.
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Robert D. Reischauer*
Welfare reform has always presented policymakers with two
related, but distinct, problems. The first has been the technical problem
of designing a reform package that could achieve the desired results
within the budget constraint. The second has been the political problem
of creating a constituency that could get the reform package enacted.
This second problem exists because, unlike farm, housing or educa-
tion policy, welfare policy has been neither an area popular with the
public nor an area that provided much political payoff for politicians.
The potential beneficiaries of welfare reform have never been politically
active and, therefore, have had little clout in Washington; and the public
has held a generally hostile view of welfare programs. When politicians
have supported welfare reforms, they have not done so because they
anticipated PAC contributions from welfare rights organizations or long
lines of appreciative recipients at the voting booths. Rather they have
supported such policies because they thought they were the right thing
to do and because they concluded that the reforms would not generate a
backlash from the voters.
Given the hostile political environment that exists for welfare
reform, an interesting policy question is whether the income main-
tenance experiments could have helped to build a constituency for
reform. Could the experiments have reduced the public’s distaste for
radical reform or mobilized the low-income population into an effective
interest group in behalf of change?
The simple answer to these questions is "no." In fact, there were
good reasons to expect that the experiments would, if anything,
strengthen the hand of those opposed to reform. Part of the reason for
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this negative conclusion lies in the nature of the negative income tax and
part lies in the particular focus of the income maintenance experiments.
Richard Elmore has argued that the political objective of the ex-
periments was to legitimate the negative income tax concept -- to give it
standing with policymakers. An essential first step in this process was
for the Office of Economic Opportunity technocrats to convince the
White House and congressional policymakers that a negative income tax
was a technically feasible policy option. The income maintenance
experiments played a modest role in doing this. While the results of the
experiments may have entered the public record of the policy debate
only twice, their contribution was more significant than Elmore sug-
gests. The findings of the experiments were discussed at dozens of plan-
ning and strategy meetings between congressional advocates of welfare
reform and policy formulators in the executive branch. They influenced
the design of the Carter welfare reform plan in numerous ways.
However, the major political hurdle was not to convince the
policymakers that a negative income tax was technically feasible but
rather to convince the American public that this radical approach to the
poverty problem was acceptable. And the experiments were not capable
of doing this, primarily because the negative income tax was designed to
address the deficiencies that the policy elite saw in the existing welfare
system, not the shortcomings that most concerned the general public.
The public felt that welfare costs were too high and that caseloads were
expanding too rapidly; they imagined that undeserving freeloaders who
were capable of work were weaseling their way onto the rolls in increas-
ing numbers; they feared that the system was encouraging marital in-
stability; they suspected that cash assistance was being squandered on
booze, color TVs and other unnecessary expenditures; and they felt that
welfare was creating a permanent dependent class. The policy elite, in
contrast, was more concerned with the inequities created by interstate
differences in payment levels and eligibility requirements, the failure to
provide assistance to two-parent families, the general inadequacy of
benefits, the stigma associated with receipt of welfare, and the political
contentiousness that surrounded discussions of income redistribution
policy.
On many dimensions, a negative income tax was bound to exacer-
bate the very aspects of the existing welfare system that most concerned
the public. For example, a negative income tax would increase costs and
welfare rolls, provide assistance to more able~bodied adults, redue.e
popular in-kind benefits in favor of more cash assistance, and allow
families to remain on welfare for life. In addition, it should be noted that
a true negative income tax would cut away what little there was in the
way of a mainstream political constituency for welfare programs, the
providers of in-kind benefits: the farmers who benefited from the food216 Robert D. Reischauer
stamp program; the real estate interests who gained from the various
housing subsidy programs; the professionals who provided the various
social services; and so on. Overall, a negative income tax clearly went
against the popular grain and, therefore, would be difficult to legitimate.
Given this situation, the political task for the experiments was to
provide information to convince the public that they would like the
results of the new system even if they did not like the manner in which a
negative income tax would provide assistance. In other words, the ex-
periments would have to highlight those aspects or responses to a
negative income tax that might attract the support of the nonrecipient
public. This strategy would have suggested emphasizing its impact on
family stability, crime and delinquency, health status, nutrition, school
achievement, and other effects that would indicate that the recipients of
a negative income tax ultimately could attain self-sufficiency.
While the income maintenance experiments did examine such
responses, these dimensions were of secondary interest. The ex-
periments focused on the measurement of the labor supply responses to
a negative income tax. Inevitably, this focus made the political problem
worse because any negative labor response would constitute a political
liability. While the policy experts might have been overjoyed to find that
the reduction in labor supply was small, a skeptical public and congres-
sional critics would not differentiate between a 5 percent and a 20 per-
cent reduction in labor supply. In both cases, more indolence was being
rewarded at the taxpayer’s expense.
The experiments were not only incapable of allaying the public’s
apprehensions concerning radical welfare reform, they were also not
capable of building a low-income constituency for reform. Because the
experiments involved only a tiny fraction of the low-income population,
most of the potential recipients of a negative income tax knew nothing
about the options that were being tested. Moreover, to the extent that
politicians used the experimental results to generate support for a
negative income tax among low-income groups, they ran the risk of
alienating the general public. A reformed system that reduced stigma,
intruded less into the lives of the poor, provided more generous
benefits, and offered assistance to families that previously had been in-
eligible might rally the low-income population, but would lose the
middle class.
The general conclusion that arises from examining the experience of
the income maintenance experiments is that, under most circumstances,
social experiments have very limited political utility. Policy analysts may
find them a useful way to convince politicians that a certain policy is
technically feasible. But in doing so they are likely to focus attention on
the politically unpopular behavioral responses to the proposed policy.
Imagine what might have happened if a social experiment had beenDISCUSSION 217
mounted in the 1920s to test the feasibility of a government-subsidized
old-age pension system. The results from this experiment would have
revealed that a large proportion of the elderly would drop out of the
labor force under the proposed pension program. While some of these
retirees would have health problems that made it difficult for them to
meet the physical demands of their jobs, many would be quite capable
of continued labor force participation. The experiment’s results would
also have shown that the proposed program would induce some
workers to drop out of the labor force even before they were eligible to
receive a pension. Would this be rewarding indolence?
Careful analysis of the experiment’s effects would also have revealed
that the new program would lead to a reduction in private retirement
saving and a slight tendency for employers to cut back on their pension
programs. In other words, only a portion of the federal pension pay-
ment would represent a net increase in the living standards of the
retirees.
The sociologists and psychologists analyzing the results of the ex-
periment would have discovered that the proposed program would
threaten accepted family patterns. Many of the affected elderly would
choose to move out of their children’s homes, some to small squalid
apartments. A few of the elderly would even move to distant places like
Florida where their children could not care for them. By all measures,
the proposed program would lead to a reduction in contacts between
parents and their children and a decrease in the sense of responsibility
that children would feel for their aged parents.
These results, while not surprising, would have represented a
political liability for advocates of social security because they would have
clashed with prevailing values and behavioral norms. But major social
reforms, like social security or a negative income tax, inevitably will
change prevailing values, behavioral norms and the political environ-
ment. In prospect, many of these changes may appear threatening and
therefore undesirable. After some years, however, they will become not
only accepted but also desirable attributes of modern living. For this
reason, advocates of major social policy changes should think twice
about the desirability of experimentation. What is gained in the way of
an understanding of the micro effects of a proposed policy may be lost in
the political realm.